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Civil Procedure
By JOHN R. LEATHERS*
During the 1975-1976 term of the Kentucky Supreme
Court over 70 decisions, both memoranda and formal opinions,
were handed down which involved procedural matters. This
proliferation of appeals on procedural matters indicates that
they are among the more common problems faced by the Court
and the practicing bar. Although no major developments were
apparent, a significant pattern emerges from a number of the
cases in separate procedural areas-effects of failures of parties
to testify, judicial supervision of discovery, powers of courts to
set aside judgments, and problems of multi-party litigation.
The results in the cases do not depart significantly from past
case law, nor do they represent deviations from decisions in
other states or the federal system. However, it is the emerging
pattern that is important. Also, it should be noted how strictly
the Court requires adherence to procedural rules and how much
deference it extends to trial court actions.'
I. FAILURE OF PARTIES TO TESTIFY
In two cases during the past term, the Supreme Court
affirmed decisions as a matter of law for failure of the parties
to testify to matters on which they had direct knowledge. In
Hall v. Westbrook2 the trial court directed a verdict against the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A.,
University of Texas at El Paso; J.D., University of New Mexico; LL.M., Columbia
University.
I It should be noted at the outset that despite the rather large number of cases in
the area, a reading of them on an individual basis is not terribly enlightening. The
reason for this is the regrettable habit of the Court of rendering a large number of
decisions which lack a sufficient recounting of the material facts to allow a critical
evaluation of the results. Too many of the decisions simply state general conclusions
of law and then order a given result. Of course there is usually no way to quarrel with
the generalities. They could only be criticized if applied to inappropriate fact patterns,
and the facts are not usually stated with sufficient clarity to allow analysis. It is
presumed that this pattern is the result of too great a caseload in the Court rather than
some other factor. If that is so, perhaps the recent judicial reorganization will allow
the new Supreme Court time to do a better job of writing opinions. Since the holding
in a case is the result on the material facts, the cases decided by the Court would be
more useful if they contained a sufficient description of the fact patterns to allow
comparison with other cases.
2 No. 75-553 (Ky. May 28, 1976) (per curiam).
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defendant, who had failed to testify or offer evidence to con-
trovert the plaintiffs testimony concerning a partnership ar-
rangement between them. In Chaffin v. Security Central Na-
tional Bank,3 the Greenup Circuit Court had granted a sum-
mary judgment for the plaintiffs in an action to set aside cer-
tain conveyances by the defendant to his son and daughter
which were alleged to have been made to defraud creditors.
Upon the advice of counsel, the defendant refused to answer
any questions concerning the transfers. Depositions were taken
from the son and daughter, who also refused upon advice of
counsel to answer any questions concerning the transfers., The
Court held that the failure of the defendant to testify was the
equivalent of an admission that the transfers had been made
to defraud creditors, therefore the summary judgment entered
against him was proper.
The failure of a party to testify is a matter of serious pro-
portion in civil cases. However, it should be noted that dis-
missal as a matter of law would not be appropriate in all cases
simply involving the failure of a party to testify. For instance,
in Hall, had the defendant introduced other credible evidence
to controvert the contentions of the plaintiff as to the relation-
ship between the parties, the directed verdict should have been
overruled. At most, the jury could be advised that they might
draw unfavorable inferences from the party's failure to testify.
In considering a motion for summary judgment or directed
verdict the issue should be whether the party failing to testify
had managed to offset the prima facie case of the opposing
party. If he has not, that failure consists not only of his failure
to testify but also of his failure to introduce other credible
evidence on the point. But under no circumstance can a party
who has not made out a prima facie case be held to have done
so simply due to the failure of the opposing party to testify. A
defendant is under no duty to defend at all unless the plaintiff
has met his burden of production.' These ideas are well illus-
trated in Chaffin, where the plaintiff pleaded a sufficient case,
3 No. 75-876 (Ky. June 25, 1976) (per curiam).
It cannot be determined from the opinion whether the advice to the children
came from their father's counsel or from their own.
5 See, e.g., Stimpson v. Hunter, 125 N.E. 155 (Mass. 1919).
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moved for summary judgment and was controverted solely by
the pleading allegations of the defendant's answer. In that cir-
cumstance, Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure [hereinafter
cited as CR] 56.03 requires the entry of judgment for the mov-
ing party.'
II. SUPERVISION OF DISCOVERY
Four cases from the last term involved court supervision
of discovery procedures. Two cases involved appeals from trial
court dismissals of parties who hampered the discovery pro-
cesses, while two other appeals were from dismissals of cases
for failure of the plaintiffs to prosecute their claims. The four
cases resulted in the application of drastic sanctions by the
respective trial courts during the pretrial stages of an action.
The common thread in the cases is that in each the Supreme
Court affirmed the dismissals and left the trial court wide dis-
cretion in supervising pretrial discovery procedures.
In Jackson v. Davis,' Dr. Jackson had decided to handle
his own defense in a malpractice action brought against him.
As the case progressed, he consistently refused to answer an
interrogatory propounded to him by the plaintiff." The trial
court and plaintiff's counsel voluntarily extended the time for
Jackson to answer but his refusal continued. The trial court
then struck all of Jackson's pleadings and found against him
on the merits of the claim for damages in a total amount of
$325,000, as permitted under CR 37.03 which governs viola-
tions of the discovery process.' Dr. Jackson died following the
I Ky. R. Cw. P. [hereinafter cited as CR] 56.03 provides:
The motion (for summary judgment) shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forth-
with if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory
in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there
is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
No. 75-1111 (Ky. July 2, 1976) (per curiam).
Interrogatories may be issued to parties pursuant to CR 33.
CR 37.03 provides:
(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a
party refuses to obey an order made under Rule 37.01 requiring him to
1976]
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verdict and the appeal from the case was handled pro se by his
wife. She proved no more adept as a lawyer than did her hus-
band, and the trial court decision was affirmed. It is difficult
to question the sanction in view of the intentional refusal of the
plaintiff to answer the interrogatory. However, such a drastic
sanction ought not to be used where the failure comes from
excusable neglect.
In Benjamin v. Near East Rug Co., & Tadross Brothers,'"
the Supreme Court affirmed the entry of a default judgment
against the defendant for his failure to answer interrogatories
during the allotted time period. After the passage of over a year
from the service of the interrogatories, judgment was entered
in the portion of the debt action belonging to Near East. At no
time did Benjamin or his counsel ask for an extension of time
to answer the interrogatories, although his counsel informed
the court that he had been unable to get answers from Benja-
min due to Benjamin's illness. That statement was made to the
court 5 months after the service of the first interrogatories and
more than 7 months prior to the entry of judgment. Given the
length of time involved and the failure of Benjamin to request
an extension or give a satisfactory explanation for his failure to
answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any
document or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to
permit it to be done, or to permit entry upon land or other property, or an
order made under Rule 35 requiring him to submit to a physical or mental
examination, the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are
just, and among other the following:
(a) An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked,
or the character or description of the thing or land, or the contents of the
paper, or the physical or mental condition of the party, or any other desig-
nated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in
accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(b) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evi-
dence designated documents or things or items of testimony, or from intro-
ducing evidence of physical or mental condition;
(c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party;
(d) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
directing the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such
orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
10 535 S.W.2d 848 (Ky. 1976).
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answer, the entry of judgment against him seems reasonable.
The ability of a trial court to dismiss an action for failure
to prosecute is an important tool for clearing clogged dockets.
Use of that tool was approved by the Supreme Court during the
last term in Jenkins v. City of Lexington1" and Whitlock v.
Edwards.2 In Jenkins the plaintiffs had sought to enjoin the
city from demolishing a building which had been condemned
by the Lexington Housing Board of Appeals. Two years after
the complaint and answer had been filed the city moved to
dismiss the action on the grounds that the plaintiff had failed
to prosecute the case adequately. When the plaintiffs failed to
appear at the hearing on the motion, the trial court dismissed
the suit pursuant to CR 41.02(1).13
In the Whitlock case the plaintiffs sought to have a deed
cancelled. The defendants pleaded that the claim was barred
by res judicata on the grounds that the plaintiffs, with others,
had brought a previous action to cancel the same deed which
had been dismissed for failure to prosecute. Since the dismissal
of the previous action for failure to prosecute was a decision on
the merits, the Court held that the second suit was barred. This
is the correct conclusion based on the status of the first deci-
sion, which had been on the docket for over 3 years without any
action having been taken by the plaintiffs, and is directly sup-
ported by CR 41.02(3).14 Any other result would not be tolerable
since the effect of such a dismissal would then be so slight that
there would be absolutely no incentive for the plaintiff to fear
a dismissal for failure to prosecute.
III. SETTING ASIDE JUDGMENTS
The power of a trial court to set aside a judgment is pro-
,, 528 S.W.2d 729 (Ky. 1976).
12 No. 75-671 (Ky. April 30, 1976) (per curiam).
,' CR 41.102(1) provides:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these Rules or any
order of the court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him.
11 CR 41.102(3) provides:
Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal
under this Rule, and any dismissal not provided for in Rule 41, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a
party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
1976]
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vided by CR 60, and is utilized to prevent injustice in individ-
ual cases. However, it should be used only in very clear cases
because of the value in promoting the notion that judgments
are dispositive of litigation. This has been the approach taken
by the Supreme Court in reviewing trial court proceedings
under CR 60.
Pedro v. Pedro'" involved an action by a woman to set
aside the property settlement which was a portion of the judg-
ment entered in a divorce action against her ex-husband. She
contended that the judgment had been procured by fraud and
should be set aside under CR 60.02."1 The trial court received
evidence on the issue of fraud in securing her approval to the
property settlement. Although there was conflicting evidence,
the court chose not to believe the wife. The trial court con-
cluded that she had not met her burden of persuasion and thus
was unable to overcome the presumption of the validity of the
divorce decree which included the settlement. The Supreme
Court reviewed the evidence and, after finding some evidence
to support the decision of the trial court, concluded that the
trial court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
The very sketchy opinion in Alexander v. Streeter Moving
& Storage Co.' 7 indicates that a plaintiff had sought to set aside
a default judgment entered against him due to his counsel's
failure to handle the case. Service was made outside Kentucky
on plaintiff's non-resident lawyer, who did not notify him nor
take any steps to defend the action. Based on normal notions
' No. 75-718 (Ky. June 11, 1976) (per curiam).
IS CR 60.02 provides:
On motion a court may, upon such terms as are just, relieve a party or his
legal representative from its final judgment, order, or proceeding upon the
following grounds: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59.02; (3) perjury or
falsified evidence; (4) fraud affecting the proceedings, other than perjury or
falsified evidence; (5) the judgment is void, or has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should
have prospective application; or (6) any other reason of an extraordinary
nature justifying relief. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,
and on grounds (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Rule does not
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
17 No. 73-583 (Ky. October 31, 1975) (per curiam).
[Vol. 65
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of the relationship between lawyer and client, this would not
appear to be sufficient to justify setting the judgment aside. It
certainly is not among the reasons to set aside listed in CR
60.02,18 and the Court gave no hint as to other possible prob-
lems in the case. Of course, the plaintiff could collaterally at-
tack the judgment as violative of procedural due process if
service on the lawyer did not meet constitutional standards of
notice. 9 He also could collaterally attack if the state lacked the
requisite power to satisfy constitutional standards of substan-
tive due process in its exercise of in personam jurisdiction.0 If
either set of facts sufficient to justify collateral attack did exist,
the judgment rendered was void. This is clearly provided by CR
60.02(5) as a ground to set aside a judgment, and there is no
time period limiting the time in which such a void judgment
can be set aside. But the facts in Alexander are so sparse that
it is impossible to tell if the relationship between lawyer and
client was sufficient to make the notice effective. It is also
impossible to tell whether the relationship of the defendant to
Kentucky was sufficient to allow an exercise of jurisdiction. If
those problems were actually present, the Court should have
noted that one of the grounds for setting aside under CR 60.02
had been raised and therefore should have considered the alle-
gations more closely.
A similar objection was raised in Sun Oil Co. v.
Kentucky, ' but the problems in Alexander in regard to due
process and unclear facts are not present here. Sun Oil sought
to set aside the default judgment entered against it on grounds
that although it had been notified of the action and had taken
some steps to defend, a mixup occurred and no defense was
made. Sun Oil claimed that a portion of the material relating
to the case had been lost in interoffice mail and that they were
deprived of a fair opportunity to defend the action. This case
clearly lacks the potential merits present in Alexander, and the
judgment was not set aside since the mistake by Sun Oil did
not meet the standard of excusable neglect required to satisfy
CR 60.02.
" CR 60.02, supra note 16.
" See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
2 No. 75-1112 (Ky. June 25, 1976) (per curiam).
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In Gabbard v. Boyd County2 a plaintiff sought to set aside
a judgment entered pursuant to an agreed settlement between
the parties. The settlement had been negotiated by counsel for
the plaintiff and had been authorized by the plaintiff. After the
entry of judgment, the plaintiff changed his mind about the
settlement and secured other counsel to seek the setting aside
of the judgment. The Supreme Court correctly held that a
change of heart is not a ground sufficient to set aside a judg-
ment. A judgment which is the result of a settlement should
have the same presumption of validity as other judgments. To
hold otherwise would certainly weaken the entire settlement
process, which is essential in view of the crowded state of most
court dockets.
IV. MULTIPLE PARTY LITIGATION
With the joinder of parties and claims allowed and encour-
aged by procedural rules based on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Supreme Court should be faced with an increas-
ing number of appeals from complex litigation. During the last
term, four cases arose from such a setting, and none of the
results represent departures from accepted practice.
In Mattingly v. Baker23 and Ramsey v. Furniture Rentals, 24
the Court was faced with appeals from portions of cases still
pending in the respective trial courts, both of which involved
multiple parties. In Ramsey and Mattingly default judgments
had been entered in favor of the respective plaintiffs. In neither
case had the trial judge found that there was just reason for
delay in the taking of the appeal or that the judgment entered
was final as required by CR 54.02.25 One of these factors must
1 No. 75-196 (Ky. April 16, 1976) (per curiam).
21 No. 75-603 (Ky. June 25, 1976) (per curiam).
24 No. 75-823 (Ky. June 11, 1976) (per curiam).
25 CR 54.02 provides:
(1) When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may grant a final judgment upon one or more
but less than all of the claims upon a determination that there is no just
reason for delay. The judgment shall recite such determination and shall
recite that the judgment is final. In the absence of such recital, any order or
other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all
the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims, and the
[Vol. 65
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be present before an appeal from a partial adjudication in mul-
tiple party litigation is allowed. Absent such finding, the order
is interlocutory and hence not subject to appeal until the entire
case is adjudicated. This is a well settled rule in the federal
system,2 1 and in any jurisdiction it seems the only way to pre-
vent piecemeal appeal of matters that may not be ripe for
appellate adjudication.
One of the most complex problems in multiple party litiga-
tion is determining when litigation can proceed without the
presence of a given party. The problem of the indispensable
party, which is controlled by CR 19.02, '27 arose in a very tradi-
tional setting in A&H Truck Line v. Kentucky Occupational
Safety and Health Review Commission.2 8 The Commission had
upheld a citation against A&H for violation of safety standards
at a truck terminal in Owensboro. A&H appealed the holding
to the Franklin Circuit Court naming the Kentucky Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Review Commission as the only party
defendant. The Supreme Court held that their failure to name
the Kentucky Department of Labor as a party defendant made
it necessary to dismiss the case for failure to join an indispensa-
ble party. Such dismissal does not operate on the merits29 and
was necessary because without the presence of the Department
of Labor no effective action could have been taken by the trial
court. The Department of Labor is empowered by statute to
enforce the orders of the Commission,3 and until so enforced
the orders are without effect. It should then be clear that any
order or other form of decision is interlocutory and subject to revision at any
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims.
21 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427 (1956).
" CR 19.02 provides:
If a person as described in Rule 19.01 cannot be made a party, the court shall
determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed
among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent person being
regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include:
(1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by relief,
or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the
plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoin-
der.
- 536 S.W.2d 315 (Ky. 1976).
21 See CR 41.102(3), supra note 14.
31 Ky. REv. STAT. § 338.181 (1972).
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court action in the absence of the Department of Labor would
be a wasted effort, because until they are bound, A&H would
not be protected. It may seem strange to dismiss a plaintiffs
action because he has not chosen to protect himself adequately,
but the interest of the judiciary in preventing such a waste of
time and effort is also important.
31
The indispensable party problem confronted the Court in
a slightly different context in Levin v. Ferrer.12 In an action to
set aside a conveyance, the defendant sought to set aside the
judgment invalidating the conveyance. The defendant had re-
ceived land from her adoptive mother in a deed which was set
aside by the trial court due to overreaching by the defendant.
While the action was pending, the mother had died. In an
attempt under CR 60.02 to set aside the judgment, the defen-
dant alleged that the conveyance had been invalidated due to
the perjured testimony of several persons, one of whom was the
decedent mother. The trial court refused to set aside the judg-
ment on the grounds that the attempt was not timely within
the one year restriction of CR 60.02. On appeal, the defendant
named the administrator of her mother's estate as the only
appellee. The Supreme Court held that the basic philosophy of
CR 19.02 applied to appeals just as it did to trial court proceed-
ings. This meant that an appeal could not proceed in the ab-
sence of parties necessary to dispose of the case adequately. In
the fact pattern in Levin, the appeal was dismissed for failure
to name as parties the persons who had succeeded to the prop-
erty of the decedent mother. As noted, the presence of the
administrator was meaningless in the action to set aside the
judgment in favor of the successors in interest to the mother.
No effective relief for the defendant could be granted against
any but the successors, who would not be bound by a judgment
against the administrator. If the action had been one to try title
to the real estate, there would not be any doubt that the succes-
sors would have to be named at the trial level as parties defen-
1, Of course, it would be simple for A&H to join the Department since the sort of
jurisdictional problems often seen in federal dismissals, where the joinder of the party
might destroy subject matter jurisdiction, will not be present in that case. See e.g.,
Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
31 535 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. 1976).
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dant. Thus the successors were necessary parties to the appeal,
and without them, a decision would have been a waste of court
time.
V. PATTERNS IN THE DECISIONS
If nothing else emerges from the decisions, it is clear that
the Supreme Court has allowed trial courts wide discretion and
has been willing to overturn only those decisions which meet
the high standard of being clearly erroneous. Every case dis-
cussed from the past term resulted in affirmance of the trial
court's actions. This indicates that the Court is indulging in a
presumption of regularity and validity in trial court actions.
This may be desirable to prevent frivolous appeals and to pre-
vent parties from litigating matters ad nauseum, but it is a
presumption that can be carried too far. The Court ought not
to indulge in the presumption so freely that no case can be
overturned on appeal. Taken to that extreme, the presumption
eliminates the need for a system of appeals.
The other fact that emerges from the cases is that the
Court adheres strictly to the letter of procedural rules. Lawyers
in the state are charged with a knowledge of the Rules and the
Court obviously expects them to be used correctly. The strict
application of the Rules may have drastic consequences on any
piece of litigation. Given this pattern, it is going to be increas-
ingly difficult for lawyers to argue that they did not appreciate
the consequences of their failure to obey the Rules. The ramifi-
cations of this conclusion both in legal malpractice suits and
Kentucky Bar Association disciplinary proceedings should be
obvious. It would then seem to behoove the practicing bar to
know the Rules well and follow them closely. Failure to do so
may have severe consequences from which it appears that nei-
ther lawyer nor client can escape.
1976]

